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Stress Testing: The Impact of Shocks on the Capital Needs of 








We use data on loan loss provisions and total loans over the period spanning 1995 
until 2009 to estimate a stress testing model for the Luxembourg banking sector.  
The sample encompasses the recent global crisis and covers a period in which the 
average probability of default of the Luxembourg banking sector’s counterparties is 
observed to increase significantly. A joint model, consisting of several 
macroeconomic variables and the logit-transformed probability of default, is specified 
and estimated via seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).  The results suggest that 
counterparty default rates are significantly affected by the euro area real GDP growth 
rate, the real interest rate and a domestic property price index.  Conversely, changes 
in the Luxembourg real GDP growth rate have a much smaller effect on counterparty 
risk.  We attribute this to the large number of foreign subsidiaries operating within 
Luxembourg.  The estimated model is then used to simulate values of the probability 
of default and the macroeconomic variables over a horizon of 10 quarters.  This 
allows us to construct distributions for the probability of default under both baseline 
and adverse scenarios.  From the results of these simulations stressed Basel II tier 1 
capital ratios are calculated and compared to their associated unstressed 
capitalization levels.  Our calculations suggest that, under all the given adverse 
macroeconomic scenarios, the aggregate Luxembourg financial sector remains 
above the 4% minimum Basel II tier 1 capital requirement.  Repeating the exercise 
on a limited sample of 5 individual banks produces similar results. 
 
JEL classification: C15, E44, G01, G21 
Keywords: financial stability; stress testing; Luxembourg banking sector; tier 1 
capital ratio; counterparty risk 
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La récente crise a révélé l’importance du suivi individuel des établissements 
bancaires, mais aussi la nécessité de développer des approches macro-prudentielles 
permettant d’appréhender les liens entre la sphère réelle de l’économie et sa 
composante financière. Ces deux approches sont complémentaires et l’attachement 
exclusif à l’une d’elles risquerait d’occulter une dimension importante de la stabilité 
financière (Borio,2009).  
Etant donné que l’approche macro-prudentielle a pour finalité le système financier 
dans son ensemble, l’accent est mis sur les expositions communes des 
établissements financiers aux différents types de chocs, plutôt que sur des facteurs 
idiosyncratiques propres aux établissements individuels. De multiples outils sont 
utilisés dans le cadre de l’approche macro-prudentielle. Cependant, les tests de 
résistance (stress tests) font l’objet d’une attention particulière de la part des 
autorités en charge de la stabilité financière. Cet intérêt s’explique par la finalité de 
ces tests, qui consiste en la quantification des répercussions de la survenance des 
chocs sur la stabilité du système financier ou sur l’une de ses composantes  : le 
système bancaire, le secteur des assurances,… 
Cette  étude dont les premiers résultats ont été publiés dans la Revue de stabilité 
financière de la BCL 2010, propose un modèle dédié à l’évaluation de la résistance 
du secteur bancaire luxembourgeois face l’émergence de certains chocs 
économiques. L’analyse est conduite à travers l’estimation d’un système d’équations, 
sur des données à fréquence trimestrielle, composé de variables macro-
économiques et de variables spécifiques aux banques. La période couverte par 
l’analyse est 1995q1-2009q3. L’objectif est de déterminer l’impact des variations des 
variables économiques sur le niveau agrégé du ratio des capitaux propres de base 
(Tier1) de l’ensemble des banques présentes au Luxembourg, mais aussi des cinq 
plus importantes banques par leurs actifs totaux .  
Quatre types de chocs ont été simulés. Il s’agit du PIB et de l’indice des prix de 
l’immobilier résidentiel au Luxembourg, du PIB de la zone euro et  des taux d’intérêt 
à trois mois. L’horizon de projection retenu pour ces scénarii est de deux ans  : 
2010-2011. Les différentes mesures d’impact issues des simulations ont été 
réalisées en terme de leur effet sur le niveau initial du ratio de solvabilité agrégé et 
individuel des banques.  
Les résultats des estimations ainsi que les simulations obtenus laissent présager une 
sensibilité importante du secteur bancaire luxembourgeois aux chocs du PIB de la 
zone euro ainsi qu’aux prix de l’immobilier au Luxembourg.  En dépit de l’amplitude 
des chocs introduits, les ratios agrégés et spécifiques aux banques individuels 
demeurent largement supérieurs au minimum légal ainsi qu’à la limite fixée 
récemment dans le stress test européen.   4
I. Introduction 
In its broadest sense, macro stress testing refers to a range of techniques employed 
in generating both baseline and adverse scenarios that can be used to gauge the 
response of a financial system to “exceptional but plausible” shocks in the prevailing 
macroeconomic conditions.  While stress tests are garnering much attention in the 
post-crisis period, they are not a recent innovation.  The origins of programs directed 
at monitoring the solidity of the financial system date back to the late 1990’s and 
arose from the IMF and World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Programs, or 
FSAPs.  The FSAP programs were originally orientated towards macro-prudential 
surveillance, but they also contained elements of micro-financial linkages.  These 
programs contributed to the development of the present financial regulations, 
supervisory frameworks and payment systems. In effect they were a kind of 
prototypical macro-prudential surveillance program.  Nevertheless, these early 
supervision frameworks were not without deficiencies.  As Blaschke et al. (2001) 
explain there are weaknesses in many aspects of the stress testing process.  One 
important limitation in the FSAP program was that the adverse scenarios employed in 
the testing were largely ad hoc.  This was complicated, in some cases, by a lack of 
adequate data, time and/or resource constraints and a lack of expertise needed to 
conduct the tests.  Finally, fewer than 50% of the FSAP programs incorporated an 
analysis of the resistance of the banking sector to liquidity shocks and yet it is known 
that liquidity crises can cause major disruptions to the stable operation of the 
financial markets. 
 
Although many authorities adopted stress testing procedures as a result of the 
implementation of the Financial Sector Assessment Programs, the IMF and World 
Bank were not the only institutions to advocate stress tests as a technique to assess 
financial stability.  Stress testing for risk management purposes also features 
prominently as a pillar in the Basel II regulations.  Supervisory authorities and central 
banks increasingly view macroeconomic stress tests as a valuable tool for assessing 
the vulnerability of the financial system.  This is true in the euro area where stress 
testing exercises have been conducted by the ECB and European supervisory 
authorities such as the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) and 
many national central banks (NCBs).  However, these exercises are not performed 
solely to evaluate the level of financial robustness; they are also used to identify any 
potential vulnerability in the financial system.  As nowadays the financial system 
extends globally, stress testing programs and efforts at the international level are 
being undertaken.  Initiatives to try and establish an international agreement on a 
macro-prudential surveillance framework are ongoing.  Nevertheless, there is 
presently no single internationally accepted standard procedure for stress testing.     
Currently there is a need for comprehensive and effective stress testing models. 
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One of the striking aspects of the recent crisis was that it was the regulated financial 
institutions that turned out to be the source of much of the turmoil.  Exacerbating this 
problem was that excessive supervisory attention was given to firms at the individual 
level, while the build-up of risks in entire sectors and markets was, for the most part, 
ignored.  As discussed in Borio (2009), it is now recognized that the development of 
systemic risk at the aggregate level is just as important, if not more so, than the 
accumulation of risk at the level of the individual institution.   The unfortunate 
oversight of this observation in the period prior to the turmoil underscores the 
deficiencies that were present in the pre-crisis supervisory framework.  In particular, 
regulators focused on micro-prudential supervision to the detriment of developments 
at the macro-prudential level. The outcome was that, in the wake of the crisis, 
significant costs were imposed on both the public sector and the macro economy in 
order to rescue the banking sector.  This resulted in profits being privatized while 
losses were socialized effectively creating no downside risks for banks.  From a 
stability perspective, it was this lack of a robust regulatory structure that permitted the 
creation of channels for the transmission of contagion and the correlated, or 
horizontal, risks that played such a prominent role in the development of the crisis.   
 
In order to rectify these deficiencies, under the mandate of the European 
Commission, the de Larosière Group (2009) proposed that the ECB should pursue a 
more prominent role in “over-seeing the macro-prudential aspects of banking 
activities” and subsequently recommended that stress-testing should be performed 
on a consistent and regular basis
1.  This proposed routine monitoring activity is 
important because systemic risk arises from the common exposures of many 
financial institutions to identical risk factors and can accumulate across institutions 
and through time.  As the recent crisis showed, episodes of financial instability can 
impose large costs on the real economy and disrupt economic growth.   
 
For these reasons, it is imperative that macro-prudential analysis attempts to analyze 
and detect the risk of common or correlated shocks which could trigger contagion 
and/or feedback effects.  As noted in Borio (2009), it is this failure to account for 
these common exposures and endogenous risks that may promote financial 
instability. Since the goal of supervision is to detect problems at an early stage, and 
thereby avoid crises, stress-testing is one particular tool that supervisory authorities 
can employ as an early detection mechanism. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The de Larosière Group report, page 20.  6
II.  Stress Testing Methodologies 
According to Sorge (2004) there are two main methodological categories of stress 
testing: the “piecewise approach” and the “integrated approach”.  The piecewise 
approach entails evaluating the susceptibility of the financial sector to individual 
macroeconomic factors.  These risk factors are subsequently used to forecast 
financial soundness indicators (FSIs) under various macroeconomic scenarios.   
Possible indicators include such variables as non-performing loans, capital ratios and 
various other risk exposures
2.  The models commonly employed are usually reduced-
form or structural in nature and time series or panel data are used for the estimation 
procedure.  In terms of their specification, linear functional forms are commonly 
utilized.  As a result, the piecewise approach has the benefit of a low computational 
burden along with the ability to provide a broad characterization of the stressed 
scenario by incorporating financial soundness indicators.  Including these soundness 
indicators in the stress testing model permits a better overall assessment of the 
vulnerability of the financial sector to exogenous macroeconomic shocks.  Studies 
using the piecewise approach include Hanschel and Monnin (2005), who construct a 
stress index of the Swiss banking system, and Kalirai and Scheicher (2002) who use 
loan loss provisions to assess vulnerabilities in the Austrian banking system.  
 
Rather than using individual FSIs, the integrated approach combines both market 
and credit risk analysis to produce an estimate of a portfolio loss distribution.  Models 
of this class were first explored by Wilson (1997a), (1997b).  The benefit of this 
method is that it is able to capture any non-linear effects that macroeconomic shocks 
may exert on credit risk.  Furthermore, shifts in the loss distribution are driven by the 
effect of macroeconomic shocks on the individual risk components.  However, these 
models mainly focus on short-horizon credit risks and tend to inadequately capture 
feedback effects which may result in parameter instabilities over the long-term.   
Nonetheless, in this work, to evaluate the response of the Luxembourg banking 
sector to a series of adverse macroeconomic scenarios, the integrated approach is 
employed.  The particular approach used is based upon the stress testing framework 
published by Wong, Choi and Fong (2008), who implement a SUR system in order to 
capture correlation in the cross-equation residuals.  During the simulation of the 
adverse scenario, the SUR specification allows them to impose the characteristic 
historical correlation pattern on the macroeconomic variables and the financial 
soundness indicator which, in their case, is taken to be the probability of default. 
 
It is worth mentioning that DSGE models have, recently, been increasingly used to 
study financial fragility.  Goodhart et al. (2006), (2009) propose a heterogeneous 
agent model with endogenous default and liquidity.  This allows them to capture the 
short to medium-term effects of endogenous default on the financial sector.  Since 
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this amounts to introducing frictions, their model can be used as a tool for studying 
the effects of monetary, productivity and fiscal policy shocks on the level of financial 
stability.  Dib (2009) uses a micro-founded DSGE framework that incorporates an 
interbank market.  In the context of this approach, bank behaviour is able to influence 
credit supply conditions and the transmission of shocks.  Via the supply and demand 
sides of credit the model is also able to incorporate frictions.  In the presence of 
these frictions, policy effects on bank capital regulations, endogenous defaults and 
the degree of leverage in the system can be analyzed using policy simulations.   
Finally, using a heterogeneous banking sector, de Walque et al. (2010) embed an 
interbank market in a standard RBC model.  This allows them to show that liquidity 
injections act to reduce financial instability.  They also are able to confirm the 
procyclicality of the Basel II regulations. 
 
Empirically based index models such as those of Hanschel and Monnin (2005), Illing 
and Liu (2006) and Rouabah (2007) have also been proposed.  This class of models 
is generally based on balance sheet and market quantities and provides a measure 
of stress, or vulnerability, in the form of a composite index.  This allows for the 
identification of periods of increasing or elevated stress in the financial sector.  There 
is, however, some concern as to whether or not these index-based indicators can 
uniquely capture rising risks in the financial system as they generally consider stress 
to be a deviation of an indicator variable from its long-run mean.  Consequently, 
uncertainty in the model specification and neglect of the higher moments (i.e. 
skewness) in the weighting of the index components remain important issues that 
need to be addressed by future research. 
 
 
III. The  Model 
To stress test the Luxembourg banking sector, we implement an integrated model, in 
the sense of Sorge (2004), and similar in form to that of Wong et al. (2008) but with 
some key differences.  In particular, our specification consists of a joint system of 
equations that incorporates lagged values of the endogenous variables.  This jointly 
specified system allows us to simultaneously model both default probabilities and 
macroeconomic variables.  The advantage of this is that it is able to account for 
interactions and feedback effects between the macroeconomic environment and the 
aggregate probability of default.  This further permits us to simulate a distribution of 
probabilities of default conditional on a given adverse scenario.  By including lags of 
the exogenous variables, this specification also allows us to capture the persistence 
of shocks to the macroeconomic variables.  This is a direct result of the presence of 
lagged values of the independent variable in the regression equations.  The 
implication is that defaults across different economic sectors can be correlated and 
macroeconomic variables may become mutually dependent.  However, our Monte 
Carlo simulations diverge from Wong et al. (2008) as we use the simulated adverse  8
scenarios to calculate stressed Basel II tier 1 capital requirements, whereas they 
estimate credit losses.  In this respect we mirror the ECB study on “The Credit Cycle 
and its Impact on EU Banking Stability”
3. 
 
A multivariate macroeconomic model is used to estimate default rates for the 
counterparties of the Luxembourg banking sector.  Within this framework, the model 
is able to produce an estimate of the likely shift in the distribution of default rates 
under various adverse macroeconomic scenarios.  This is classed as a top-down 
approach that links changes in the macroeconomic environment to the aggregate 
counterparty probability of default.  The advantage of the top-down stress test over 
the bottom-up test is that it applies the same testing procedure to all banks rather 
than testing on a bank by bank basis.  Nonetheless, nothing impedes us from 
applying the method to individual banks and we perform such an exercise in section 
VI.  However, the disadvantage is that the stress test must be based on historical 
data and, subsequently, historical relationships between the probability of default and 
macroeconomic conditions.  Consequently, we may not capture the complete 
spectrum of risks facing banks’ current portfolios but it nevertheless allows us to 
simulate the impact of other sectors’ defaults on the Luxembourg banking sector.  In 
turn, these results can be used to calculate Basel II tier 1 capital ratios. 
 
Estimation of the model was conducted using a seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) system in order to capture any contemporaneous correlation in the cross-
equation residuals.   Within this multivariate framework, the model is able to produce 
an estimate of the likely shift in the distribution of default rates under various adverse 
macroeconomic scenarios.  Since data on the aggregate default rate of Luxembourg 
banking sector counterparties was unavailable, it was necessary to construct a time 
series of historical probabilities of default.  To estimate the probability of default an 
aggregate balance sheet was constructed using a ratio of provisions on loans to total 
loans over all sectors.  This ratio was used as an approximation for the aggregate 
probability of default, thereby providing a metric for assessing the vulnerability of the 
Luxembourg financial system to various adverse macroeconomic scenarios.  Though 
provisioning provides an estimate of the probability of default, it is important to 
recognize that loan loss provisions are an imperfect approximation for default rates 
over the business cycle.  Specifically, provisioning is considered tax deductible in 
some countries and therefore loan loss provisions may only partially reflect credit risk 
concerns and the true degree of loan impairments.  Indeed, loan loss provisions 
themselves can, in some cases, be used in order to meet regulatory capital 
requirements.  Additionally, both of these series are considered to be backward-
looking, so the results of the test should therefore be interpreted with some care.  
Nonetheless, the default probabilities can be related to a comprehensive and joint 
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system of macroeconomic variables that links the fundamental economic 
environment to the vulnerability of the banking sector as a whole. 
 
The historical probability of default series consists of quarterly observations over the 
period from the first quarter of 1995 until the third quarter of 2009 resulting in a total 
of 59 observations over a 14 year period.  Since  t p  is a probability, and therefore lies 
in the fixed interval [] 1 , 0 , a logit transform, given by equation (1), is applied: 
 













ln   (1) 
 
Note that  t y  and  t p  are inversely related to one another.  Equation (1) transforms 
t p  such that  t y  takes on values in the interval  ∞ < < ∞ − t y .  We assume that the 
dynamics of  t y  are governed by a set of macroeconomic variables both foreign and 
domestic in origin.  Figure 1 shows the evolution of the counterparty default 
probability over the period from 1995 until 2009.  The increase in counterparty risk 
corresponding to the crisis period can be clearly seen in the latter half of the chart. 
 
[ Figure 1 about here ] 
 
In detailed terms, the macroeconomic model consists of a joint system of six linear 
equations for the probability of default, the growth rate of Luxembourg GDP, the euro 
area real GDP growth rate, the real interest rate, the change in real property prices, 
and returns on the SX5E index.  This specification allows for feedback effects 
between the probability of default series and the evolution of the macroeconomic 
variables.  In particular, using one or two lags of the endogenous variables in the 
regression allows for the persistence and transmission of exogenous shocks through 
the system.  Through the SUR specification, the probability of default can be related 
to a group of macroeconomic variables thereby linking the fundamental economic 
environment to the vulnerability of the banking sector as a whole.  Any correlation 
between shocks is captured by the variance covariance matrix of the residual series.  
This matrix is used to impose the characteristic correlation structure on the 
macroeconomic variables when conducting the Monte Carlo simulations.   
The equations for the probability of default and the macroeconomic variables are 
given by equations (2) and (3), respectively: 
 
  t k t k t s t s t t ν y Φ y Φ x A x A m y + + + + + + + = − − − + K K 1 1 1 1   (2) 
  t p t p t t ε x B x B n x + + + + = − − K 1 1   (3) 
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In our case,  t y  is  1 1× ,  t x  is an  1 × M  vector of M  macroeconomic variables,  s + 1 A  
is  M × 1 , and  k Φ ,  k t− y  and  t ν are scalars.  Finally,  p B  is an  M M ×  coefficient 
matrix and  t ε  is an  1 × M  vector of independent and identically normally distributed 
disturbances.  The variance covariance matrix, E , is given by: 
 




















E , , ~ N   (4) 
 
This specification allows for feedback effects between the probability of default series 
and the evolution of the macroeconomic environment thereby making the probability 
of default dependent on the chosen macroeconomic variables.  Incorporating lagged 
values of the dependent variables allows for the persistence and transmission of 
exogenous shocks through the system.  This approach has some advantages over 
the standard VAR models as used, for example, in Hoggarth, Sorensen and Zicchino 
(2004) and Filosa (2007) which ignore the contemporaneous correlation between the 
residuals.  This naïve VAR system may cause the estimated coefficients to be biased 
in addition to ignoring tail effects.  Fong and Wong (2008) have addressed this latter 
issue by estimating an MVAR model which uses a mixture of Gaussian distributions 
to better capture tail effects.  Notwithstanding these alternative approaches, the SUR 
estimation allows for the extraction of the variance covariance matrix of the residual 
series.  In turn, this can be used to impose the characteristic correlation structure on 
the evolution of the macroeconomic variables when conducting the Monte Carlo 
simulations.  In this context, the SUR system provides a parsimonious modeling of 




IV.   Model Estimation 
The SUR system is derived from equations (2) and (3) and consists of six equations
4 
which are jointly estimated over the sample period.  Econometrically, the 
macroeconomic time series are required to be stationary so the first differences of 
the log of Euro area and Luxembourg real GDP along with the first differences of the 
series for real property prices are employed in the estimation.  Consequently, the 
GDP series are expressed in terms of growth rates while the SX5E data is expressed 




                                                 
4 In this case there is one equation for the probability of default and five equations for the 
respective macroeconomic variables.  11
 
The table reports coefficient estimates, and missing entries in the table signify that 
these variables were not included in the equation specifications.  The signs of the 
coefficients appear appropriate for the expected dependence of the probability of 
default on the selected macroeconomic variables.  It is clear that increases in the 
growth rate of both Luxembourg and Euro area GDP result in an increase of t y , 
which is inversely related to the probability of default.  Correspondingly, within the 
context of the model, a decrease in Euro area or Luxembourg economic growth could 
result in a positive increase in the probability of default of the Luxembourg banking 
sector counterparties.  A similar effect can be observed for the property price index, 
although the regression coefficient shows a considerable amount of uncertainty.   
Finally, an increase in the real interest rate will negatively impact  t y  resulting in a 
positive increase in the probability of default.  Additionally, the lagged probability of 
default coefficient is positive and significant which suggests that autocorrelation in 
the probability of default series will result in exogenous shocks persisting for a time 
horizon exceeding the duration of the shock.  The same observation holds for the 
macroeconomic variable equations.  Therefore, the model correctly captures the 
expected dynamics between the macro-economy and the probability of default.   
 
 
V.  Monte Carlo Simulation and Stress Testing 
Once estimated, the model can be used to gauge how the probability of default of 
counterparties responds to exogenous shocks in the macroeconomic environment.  
To predict the response of the system, we can use a Monte Carlo simulation to 
generate both a baseline and a conditional adverse scenario for the probability of 
default.  The baseline scenario is constructed by first drawing a random sample from 
a standard normal distribution. In order to impose the model-specific correlation 
pattern on the simulation, this random vector  t ζ  of normal variates and dimension 
() 1 1 × + M  is pre-multiplied by the Cholesky decomposition of the residual variance 
covariance matrix Σ, estimated from the SUR system.  This gives a matrix C such 
that  C C ′ = Σ .  This procedure produces a pseudo-random vector r of correlated 
disturbances which is added to the equations via  t ν  and  t ε  defined in the regression 
model.  Effectively, this is given by  t t ζ C r ′ = .  Through recursion of equations (2) and 
(3) it is therefore possible to generate simulated forward values of both the probability 
of default and the macroeconomic variables over some finite horizon period.  The 
end result of this process is that a distribution of the probabilities of default can be 
constructed.  The distribution thus generated can subsequently be considered as the 
baseline scenario. 
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The adverse scenario is constructed in a similar manner, except that at various 
periods throughout the simulation horizon exogenous shocks are applied to the 
individual macroeconomic variable equations.  Consequently, the distribution, 
conditional on the shocks, of the adverse scenario probability of default is governed 
by the dynamics of the macroeconomic variables in combination with the persistence 
of the shocks induced by the lagged specification of the model.  This ability to 
generate two separate distributions for the probability of default allows for 
comparison of the estimated baseline and adverse scenarios when an artificial and 
exogenous shock is applied to a particular macroeconomic variable.  The application 
of the exogenous shocks to the variables of the model allows us to analyze the 
sensitivity of the probability of default distribution to specific adverse macroeconomic 
developments.  Thus, under this type of deterministic approach, the response of the 
distribution can be evaluated for more complex macroeconomic scenarios.  In any 
case, comparing the distributions provides information on the probable impact of 
macroeconomic shocks on the probability of default and can thus the procedure can 
be considered as a form of stress test.   
 
In order to perform the actual stress test, we must decide on some exceptional but 
plausible stressed scenarios.  It is the selection of these scenarios that lies at the 
heart of a stress test.  It is critical that the scenarios selected are neither too extreme 
nor too mild in their impact on the system because if the exogenous shocks are 
chosen inappropriately then the exercise will provide no relevant insight. 
 
Four different stressed scenarios were employed with shocks being applied 
individually to the selected macroeconomic variables.  The scenarios were chosen in 
order to focus on the various aspects of the transmission mechanism between the 
macroeconomic environment and the counterparty credit risk of the Luxembourg 
banking sector.  The four specific scenarios include both domestic and EU level 
effects and are taken over a horizon of 9 quarters starting in 2009 Q3 and ending in 
2011 Q4. The scenarios are comprised of the following: 
 
1.  A decrease in Luxembourg’s real GDP growth of magnitude 4% starting in 
2010 Q1 and ending in 2010 Q4 
2.  A decrease in Euro area real GDP growth of magnitude 1% for the first two 
quarters of 2010, magnitude of 0.5% in Q3 and no shocks in the subsequent 
quarters 
3.  An increase in real interest rates of 200 basis points in the first quarter of 
2010 and a further increase of 100 basis points in 2010 Q3 
4. A reduction in real property prices of magnitude 2% in 2010 Q1 and 
subsequent losses of 2% over the remaining quarters of 2010 
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Shocks of this magnitude represent particularly severe disturbances.  It is important 
to note that if the shocks are too small, the test will provide no insight into the 
possible impact on the probability of default.  Conversely, if the shocks are too large 
in magnitude, then the probability of such an event occurring would be too small and 
the testing exercise risks being uninformative.  All shocks are applied on a quarter-to-
quarter basis over the separate scenarios.  For both the baseline and adverse 
scenarios we performed 10000 Monte Carlo simulations of the model and used the 
10000 simulated probabilities of default in the last quarter of 2011 to construct the 
histograms.  A sample of simulated default paths is shown in figure 2 while the actual 








For all scenarios, the histograms exhibit a characteristic shift to the right of the 
stressed distribution, indicating that the average probability of default under the 
adverse scenario increases relative to the baseline scenario.  An associated increase 
in the standard deviation is also observed along with increased weight in the tails of 
the distributions.  For the shock to Luxembourg real GDP growth, the mean 
probability of default increases from 1.31% to 1.46% under the adverse scenario.  
For the remaining scenarios the increase is from 1.31% to 1.62% for Euro area real 
GDP growth, 1.31% to 1.58% for an increase in the real interest rate and from 1.31% 
to 1.61% under shocks to Luxembourg real property prices.  Tail probabilities under 
the stressed scenario rarely exceed 3.5% and no scenario displays probabilities of 
default in excess of 4%.  Despite the severity of the scenarios, the results for the 
selected adverse scenarios suggest that exogenous shocks to fundamental 
macroeconomic variables have a limited and somewhat mild effect on the average 
probability of default.     
 
The results of the Monte Carlo simulation can also be used to gain insight into the 
capitalization level of the entire Luxembourg banking sector.  Using equations (5) and 
(6) for capital requirements for corporate exposures and Basel II tier 1 capital ratios, 
respectively, it is possible to calculate capital requirements under the adverse 
scenario.   
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In equation (5),  () PD G  represents the inverse normal distribution with the probability 
of default,PD, as its argument.  Here  () ⋅ N  is the cumulative normal distribution,  c R  
denotes asset correlation and b is the maturity adjustment.  The asterisk superscript 
on  k  denotes capital requirements under the stressed scenario.  In equation (6), K  
denotes tier 1 capital, Π and RWA denote profit and risk weighted assets, 
respectively, and 
c E  represents corporate exposures.  In equation (6) we do not 
specify a profit model; rather we assume that profits remain static. 
 
This is an informative stress test in that it provides information on capitalization ratios 
under adverse macroeconomic conditions.  To calculate the capital ratio, we use data 
on bank profitability, risk weighted assets, loans and the amount of tier 1 capital held 
by banks.  As the entire sector is studied, it is important to stress these values 
represent average quantities.  Throughout the analysis, the loss given default (LGD) 
is assumed to be 0.5, or 50%, and a maturity adjustment is used based on the Basel 
II regulations for risk-weighted assets for corporate, sovereign and bank exposures.  
The mean value of the 10000 probability of default values obtained from the Monte 
Carlo simulation is used during the calculation of the Basel II correlation and capital 
requirements.   
 
Figure 7 presents a bar chart showing the banking sector capital ratios under the four 
stressed scenarios in comparison to the baseline scenario. 
 
[Figure 7] 
   
The horizontal line in the figure represents the Basel II minimum capital requirement 
of 4% while the bar on the extreme left shows the capitalization ratio of the baseline 
scenario.  Shocks to Luxembourg real GDP growth evidently have little impact on 
bank capitalization levels, while shocks to the remaining variables, and especially 
Euro area real GDP growth, visibly impact capital ratios in comparison to the baseline 
scenario.  Indeed, in the Euro area real GDP case the tier I capitalization ratio 
decreases from 11.7% to 6.4%. 
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VI.  Study of Five Systemic Luxembourg Banks 
In addition to the aggregate results of the Luxembourg banking sector, the 
simulations were repeated for a study involving the five largest and most systemic 
banks operating in Luxembourg.  These banks were ranked based on total assets.  
Table 2 shows their tier 1 capital ratios for both the baseline and adverse scenarios 
under a Basel II regime while figure 8 shows the related histogram for a selected 
bank.  The capital ratios under the adverse scenario are evaluated under conditions 
in which the four macroeconomic variables of the model are independently subjected 
to shocks.  These stressed scenarios are identical to the scenarios used for the 






From table (2) it is clear that all 5 banks in the sample are able to retain a tier 1 
capital ratio above the minimum accepted level of 4%.  However, adverse shocks to 
the Euro area real GDP growth rate and a decline in the Luxembourg property price 
index preferentially affect capitalization ratios compared to shocks applied to 
Luxembourg’s GDP growth rate and the real interest rate.  Despite the decreases in 
capital buffers resulting from a decrease in the real GDP growth rate of the Euro 
area, banks in the sample exhibit capital ratios comfortably above the 4% minimum.  
Indeed, Banks 1 and 4 appear quite robust under all adverse scenarios considered.  
Individual bank performance notwithstanding, it is evident that the banks in the 
sample are most vulnerable to decreases in the euro area GDP growth rate, followed 
by falls in the property price index.  These variations in tier 1 capital ratios can be 
attributed primarily to the respective levels of exposure of an individual bank. 
 
 
VII.  Some Remarks on What the Stress Tests Do Not Provide 
As mentioned in Jones, Hilbers and Slack (2004), stress tests can “provide 
information on how much could be lost under a given scenario, but not how much is 
likely to be lost”.  The results of a stress test then are a numerical estimate of 
sensitivity conditional on a given set of adverse macroeconomic conditions and allow 
us to understand the sensitivity of a financial system to various risk factors.  In the 
absence of a formalized selection criterion for the adverse scenario, a series of 
assumptions and judgments must be made in determining the exceptionality and 
plausibility of the shocks.  Naturally, this introduces a wide margin of error into the 
testing results and they must consequently be interpreted with care.  This is true 
even more so if the data is aggregated over the entire sector rather than being at the 
level of an individual bank.  16
Typically stress testing exercises are performed at the level of a subset of institutions 
that comprise the financial sector.  However, such a specification ignores the 
complex linkages and feedback mechanisms present in financial systems although 
some studies on contagion such as Degryse and Nguyen (2004) and Gropp and 
Vesala (2004) have attempted to fill this gap.  Depending on the nature and origins of 
financial turmoil, this can be a considerable disadvantage as we have seen during 
the recent crisis that these connections and channels can play a primary role in the 
unfolding of an episode of financial instability.  Additionally, system-focused tests 
tend to aggregate a number of heterogeneous banks into a single financial system.  
This is not as robust as a test conducted at the individual level and requires that 
dissimilar banks are analyzed in an identical manner.  For these reasons, system 
level stress tests are designed to complement individual bank tests rather than to 
replace them.  However, in practice, system level tests are more tractable in both an 
analytical and computational sense.  One advantage is that the result of a system-
wide test can convey information regarding possible contagion and the potential 
effects on stability for the entire financial sector.  Nevertheless, it remains that 
conducting tests at both the individual and aggregated level provides the maximum 
amount of information about the vulnerability of the financial system to economic 
shocks. 
 
Another limitation of stress tests is that they do not take into account endogenous 
actions by financial institutions or monetary authorities.  While such an assumption 
may be valid in the short-term, in the long-run this is clearly unrealistic and an 
oversimplification.  When stressed, financial institutions will readjust their balance 
sheets by selling distressed assets or rebalancing portfolios as part of their normal 
risk management activities.  Additionally, central banks and governments will 
intervene during crises either through monetary policy or more exceptional measures 
as was observed during the most recent period of instability.  These effects, of 
considerable importance to the promotion of financial stability, are not captured by 
the types of econometric models employed in stress testing.  Consequently, the 
actual response of the financial system to an exogenous shock may be quite different 
than the outcome predicted by a stress test.  
 
It is possible to apply a formal method for adverse scenario selection such as that 
discussed in Breuer, Jandačka, Rheinberger and Summer (2009).  The authors 
propose the use of the Mahalanobis distance as a measure of the plausibility of an 
adverse shock.  This metric is given by equation (7): 
 
  ( )() () μ r μ r r − ⋅ ⋅ − =
−1 : Cov Maha
T  (7) 
 
where  r  is the test scenario and μ is the mean or center of mass representing an 
average scenario.  This measure thus represents the number of standard deviations  17
by which r  exceeds μ, taking into account the correlation structure between the risk 
factors.  The interpretation is rather intuitive and suggests that a large Mahalanobis 
distance represents a low plausibility of the scenario, r.  Although we could apply 
such a formalized method, we choose some plausible scenarios by keeping in mind 
the limitations of selecting the scenarios in the absence of a formalized method.  It is 
important to note that such an ad hoc selection method could result in the omission 
of some plausible adverse scenarios.  The end result is that while we might be 
selecting an adverse scenario, it may not be either the most plausible or most 
plausibly adverse scenario.  Thus, there may be in existence some more plausible 
and even more harmful scenarios than those selected for this study. 
 
 
VIII.   Conclusion 
Despite some heterogeneity amongst the capital ratios computed for the panel study, 
overall the results suggest that, in the aggregate, Luxembourg banks would possess 
a tier 1 capital buffer sufficient to absorb the macroeconomic shocks studied in this 
stress-testing exercise.  More specifically, Basel II tier 1 capital ratios would remain 
comfortably above the current regulatory minimum of 4% under all the adverse 
macroeconomic scenarios considered.  Luxembourg’s banking sector therefore 
appears well positioned to deal with any further adverse macroeconomic 
developments.  However, it should be noted that there are some limitations to this 
study.  First, we have assumed that banks’ balance sheets remain static at the end of 
the observed data. Secondly, throughout the simulation horizon, we have assumed 
that bank profits remain constant.  These constraints point towards areas of potential 
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Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 2: 
PD Simulated Sample Path with Confidence Intervals 































































































































































Baseline Scenario Adverse Scenario
 
  Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Figure 5: 
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Figure 7:  
Basel II capital ratios for the Luxembourg banking sector under 
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Figure 8:  
Basel II capital ratios for Bank 1 of the Luxembourg banking 
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Table 1:  
Results of the SUR system estimation for the period 1995 Q1 to 2009 Q3 
 Dependent  Variable 
Variable  t y   ()
EUR
t g ln Δ ()
LUX
t g ln Δ t r   () t p ln Δ   () t e sx5 ln Δ
Intercept  0.162*** 0.002*  0.009*** 0.001 0.002  0.002 
()
EUR
t g 1 ln − Δ   4.399*** 0.422*  0.120      
()
EUR
t g 2 ln − Δ     -0.041     0.398**   
()
EUR
t g 3 ln − Δ     0.120        
()
LUX
t g ln Δ   0.989**          
()
LUX
t g 1 ln − Δ      -0.209      
1 − t r   -1.535    0.025 0.890*   
() 1 ln − Δ t p   0.623       0.933*   
() 1 5 ln − Δ t e sx      0.027**    0.919* 
1 − t y   0.961*          
2 R   0.985 0.424  0.124  0.843  0.943  0.829 
No. of obs.  57  64  58  58  56  58 
     Notes:  
1.  In the equations for  t y ,  ()
EUR
t g ln Δ  and  t p Δ  dummy variables have been added in order 
to control for structural breaks 
2.  In the table *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations, CSSF 
 
 
Table 2:  
Comparison of Basel II tier 1 capital ratios for the baseline and 
stressed scenario for the five largest systemic banks in 
Luxembourg 
 Stressed  Scenario  Bank 
Baseline  LU GDP  EA GDP  Int. Rate  Property 
Bank 1  0.107  0.106 0.100 0.102  0.100 
Bank 2  0.137  0.127 0.116 0.120  0.116 
Bank 3  0.343  0.332 0.315 0.321  0.315 
Bank 4  0.162  0.160 0.154 0.156  0.154 
Bank 5  0.154  0.151 0.143 0.146  0.143 
   
        Source: Authors’ calculations 
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